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APPELLATE REVIEW OF UNPRESERVED QUESTIONS
IN CRIMINAL CASES: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE
"INTEREST OF JUSTICE"
Larry Cunningham*
I. INTRODUCTION

As a general rule, an appellate court can consider a claim
on appeal only if the appellant properly preserved it in the court
below. A claim or issue is preserved if it was presented to the
lower court at the proper time and with sufficient specificity so
that the trial court had an opportunity to correct the alleged error
at the time it was made. Preservation is thus accomplished by a
simple, timely on-the-record "objection" along with a brief
explanation of its basis. Ordinarily, a court will not grant relief
on a claim that is presented for the first time on appeal.
Preservation serves important purposes. A timely and
specific objection alerts the trial court and the adversary to the
alleged error, giving both an opportunity to correct the problem
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or take ameliorative action, thus potentially obviating the need
to raise the issue on appeal. It thus encourages truth-seeking, the
efficient resolution of the case, and the conservation of appellate
resources. Preservation also discourages gamesmanship by
preventing a party from saving a "trump card" argument until
appeal.
However, preservation is not without its costs, particularly
to a criminal defendant. When an attorney unwittingly fails to
preserve an argument, his or her client may serve a potentially
lengthy sentence even though an otherwise viable claim for a
new trial may appear on the record.
In recognition of this dilemma, some legislatures and courts
have crafted a narrow exception to the preservation requirement.
In limited circumstances, an appellate court may consider an
unpreserved question even though no objection or other protest
was made to the trial court. This article will consider the
approaches taken by the federal courts and New York state in
this area. On their face, the approaches seem very different. The
federal rule is detailed, specific, and structured. New York, on
the other hand, simply directs its intermediate appellate courts to
consider unpreserved questions if doing so is "in the interest of
justice." Despite these apparent differences, the rules are
actually quite similar in practice.
In the federal system, the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court can notice an unpreserved issue if it constitutes a "plain
error." Decades of Supreme Court precedent have resulted in a
four-part test to determine whether an error qualifies as "plain."
Ultimately, however, the plain error rule is unsatisfactory for
two reasons. First, one aspect of the test boils down to whether
the defendant can show prejudice by the failure to preserve the
claim. In other words, the defendant must demonstrate a
successful appellate claim in order to overcome the preservation
hurdle. Thus, preservation is fairly meaningless. If the defendant
has a winning argument on the merits, the court will dispense
with preservation. If, on the other hand, the defendant's claim
would fail anyway, the court will apply preservation to bar the
claim. The result, either way, is that the court is looking beyond
the failure to preserve and analyzing the merits of the claim,
creating exactly the type of inefficiency that preservation is
designed to avoid.
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Second, the federal rule is problematic because it provides
discretion to the appellate court to determine, notwithstanding
the presence of a prejudicial error, whether a "miscarriage of
justice" would result if the plain error rule was not applied. Yet,
the courts have not provided a workable definition of
"miscarriage of justice," except most agree that the plain error
rule should be used to free an innocent person.
New York has a similarly unworkable rule. In New York,
only intermediate appellate courts-typically, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court-can decide unpreserved
questions. Statutory authority provides that they may do so only
in the "interest of justice." No further guidance or explanation
about this ambiguous term is provided by statutes or case law.
The result is a hodgepodge of cases that seem to suggest that an
appellate court will exercise its interest-of-justice jurisdiction
only if the defendant has a winning claim on the merits.
Otherwise, it will find the issue to be unpreserved and will
decline to exercise its interest-of-justice authority to review the
claim. Thus, as with the federal plain error rule, New York's
preservation doctrine is essentially a meaningless smokescreen.
In this article, I will propose a new way of looking at these
preservation exceptions in criminal cases. I suggest a number of
substantive factors to aid courts in deciding whether the interest
of justice warrants appellate review. I also encourage courts to
be more explicit in explaining why they are or are not granting
exceptions to preservation on a case-by-case basis.
I will proceed as follows: In Part II, I will discuss the
competing policies between preservation and defendants' due
process rights. In Part III, I will compare and contrast the federal
and New York exceptions to preservation, noting the flaws in
each test. In Part IV, I will demonstrate why a factors test would
better serve the goals of preservation while providing for needed
exceptions. I will also outline a workable factors test for courts
to apply.
II. THE PRESERVATION DOCTRINE

A. The Rule
Except in rare instances when they exercise original
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jurisdiction' or when the law provides for a de novo trial,
appellate courts exist solely to determine whether trial courts
committed reversible errors in proceedings below. 3 An appeal is
not a do-over of the original proceeding. Rather, an appellantthe party prosecuting the appeal-must assert various claims of
error. These are specific points in the proceeding below in which
someone is alleged to have committed a mistake. Perhaps the
trial judge erroneously admitted a piece of evidence. The
prosecutor made an inappropriate remark in summation. Defense
counsel improvidently conceded a point. Or, the jury found the
defendant guilty when it should have acquitted. These are all
examples of claims that can, and typically are, raised in an
average criminal appeal.
Applying the appropriate standard of review, the appellate
court determines whether it agrees with the appellant that there
was error. However, not all error warrants reversal. The second
step of the appellate court's inquiry is to determine whether a
particular error amounts to reversible error. Some errors are
"harmless" and do not require reversal.s
In conducting its review, an appellate court is ordinarily
limited to the record below: the papers submitted to the clerk
and the minutes of any proceedings before the trial judge. An
appellate court cannot, and will not, take testimony anew or
consider other new evidence.
1. See e.g. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls," and
"those in which a state shall be party") (available in electronic form at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/tocs/toc.html).
2. See e.g. Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-136 (providing for de novo hearings in criminal
appeals) (Westlaw 2010).
3. See generally Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will
Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved-Part1, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 91, 93
(1931); David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal ": The History of Review in American

Criminal Courts, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 518 (1990) (tracking the history of
appellate review and explaining why the Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional
right to appellate review, even in criminal cases).
4. See People v. Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d 248, 254 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981) ("an appeal
... is not intended as a duplication of trial-level proceedings").
5. See e.g. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.05(1) (providing that "[a]n appellate court
must determine an appeal without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties"); People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 789 (N.Y.
1975) (discussing harmless error tests in New York); see generally Sam Kamin, Harmless
Errorand the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
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The preservation doctrine is a natural outgrowth of these
fundamental principles of appellate practice. Briefly stated, a
claim is "preserved" if it was first presented to the trial court, at
some readily identifiable portion of the record, with sufficient
specificity, at a time when the error could have been corrected.6
If, however, a claim was never presented to the court below, an
objection was made but it was untimely, the objection was "offthe-record," or the objection lacked specificity, the claim is said
to be "unpreserved." With rare exception-discussed in Part
Ill-an appellate court will not consider unpreserved issues on
appeal. The forfeited issue is simply passed over, its merits
never addressed.
During a trial, a claim is preserved if a timely objection was
made and either the basis is stated on the record or is fairly
obvious from the context. For example, if a party believes a
particular question by an adversary calls for inadmissible
hearsay, the party must object and state, briefly, the reasons for
the objection, unless it is clear that hearsay is the ground of the
protest.9 Thus, preservation in this instance can be accomplished
simply by two words, "Objection. Hearsay."' 0 The court rules on
the objection, either sustaining or overruling it. Some
jurisdictions have now eliminated the requirement that a party
must "take an exception" to the court's ruling." Rather, the
objection itself preserves the issue for appeal, assuming it was
overruled. Of course, if it was sustained, there is nothing to
appeal from since the party obtained exactly what it wanted: a
legal ruling in its favor.
A party may argue on appeal that there was error
notwithstanding the sustained objection, because the proverbial
bell could not be "unrung" by the court's ruling.' 2 The party
6. See Jones, 440 N.Y.S. at 254.

7. Campbell, supra n. 3, at 92 (noting that "[i]f a party expects to rely on a contention
in the highest court of review, he should preserve it").
8. Fred Warren Bennett, Preserving Issues for Appeal: How to Make a Record at

Trial, 18 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 87, 95-100 (Summer 1994).
9. Id. at 100.
10. Id. at 99.
11. 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1227 (Westlaw/Thomson Reuters 2010).
12. Corwin v. Dickey, 373 S.E.2d 149, 151 (N.C. App. 1988) (ordering a new trial
because "we do not believe the trial court's sustaining plaintiffs' objections to those
remarks was sufficient to remove the effects of these highly prejudicial statements");
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may assert that the question itself was so egregious that it
warranted either a cautionary instruction or even a mistrial.
Here, too, these alleged errors-the absence of a curative
instruction or a mistrial-must be preserved. To preserve the
claim for appeal, counsel must have asked the trial court to issue
a curative instruction or to declare a mistrial, notwithstanding
the sustained objection.' 3 The failure to do so forfeits the claim
on appeal. Stated simply, a party must continue protesting and
asking for relief from the trial court until it obtains a negative
ruling. An overruled objection, a refusal to issue a curative
instruction, or a denial of a motion for mistrial are all negative
rulings that indicate the issue has been fully preserved.
B. Reasonsfor the Rule
Several reasons are offered for the preservation doctrine,
which has been characterized as going "to the heart of the
common law tradition and the adversary system," 4 as "a natural
and familiar outgrowth of our adversarial system of justice," 5
and as a doctrine that serves "a legitimate State purpose."' 6
Without it, "the State's fundamental interest in enforcing its
criminal law could be frustrated b' delay and waste of time and
resources invited by a defendant."
People v. Fletcher, 509 N.E.2d 625, 629 (111.App. 1st Dist. 1987) ("Further, the
prosecutor's persistence in making the improper remarks eliminated the salutary effect of
the trial judge's sustaining of the defense objections. ....'The fact that the court sustained
objections to the prejudicial statements did not cure the errors in the case. . . . Driving a
nail into a board and then pulling the nail out does not remove the hole."' (citations
omitted)).
13. People v. D'Alessandro, 591 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004 (App. Div., Ist Dept. 1992)
(pointing out that "[m]ost of the prosecutor's remarks complained of by the defense were
followed by sustained objections or sustained objections accompanied by curative
instructions," that the defense "never protested the adequacy of the relief accorded by the
Judge and neither objected to the curative instructions nor requested additional
instructions," and that its "motion for a mistrial ... was largely expressed in general
terms").
14. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n. I (3d Cir. 1982),
vacated on othergrounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).

15. Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
16. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976) (noting importance of
"[s]trict adherence to the requirement that complaint be made in time to permit a
correction").
17. Id.
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1. An Opportunityfor the Adversary and Trial Court to Correct
the Defect or Problem in the FirstInstancel8
A timely objection-in other words, made at the time of the
alleged error-alerts one's adversary and the trial court to the
party's complaint. If the adversary persists in its course of action
by, for example, continuing to introduce evidence that might be
inadmissible, the adversary cannot complain later of being
surprised when the issue is raised on appeal. On the other hand,
the objection also gives the adversary an opportunity to
withdraw the evidence or limit any unfair prejudice. Either way,
the necessity of an appeal is obviated. The party has gotten
exactly what it wanted: the evidence is not offered.
A timely objection also alerts the trial court to the potential
legal problem with allowing the evidence. A trial judge, not
wanting to be reversed, might then limit the evidence, issue a
curative instruction, or take some other action that addresses the
objecting party's concerns.19
In the context of claims of legal insufficiency, preservation
furthers the truth-seeking purpose of a trial.20 Consider: If the
prosecution fails to adduce legally sufficient evidence by, for
example, omitting proof of an element, the defendant's timely
and specific motion for a trial order of dismissal will alert the
prosecution to the infirmity. Obviously if there is no proof for
the element, the charge is dismissed. On the other hand, if the
omission was accidental, the objection enables the prosecution
defect, and further the goal
to petition to reopen its case, cure the 21
of seeking the truth of the accusation.
18. See Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n. 1; People v. Hawkins, 900 N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y.
2008); People v. Gray, 652 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Robinson, 326 N.E.2d

784, 786 (N.Y. 1975); Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254; Campbell, supra n. 3, at 91; Joe Ivy
Gillespie, Student Author, Appellate Review in a Criminal Case ofErrorsMade Below Not

Properly Raised and Preserved, 23 Miss. L.J. 42, 43 (1951); Robert J. Martineau,
ConsideringNew Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the GorillaRule, 40 Vand. L.

Rev. 1023, 1029-30 (1987).
19. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n. 1.
20. Hawkins, 900 N.E.2d at 950.
21. See e.g. People v. Whipple, 760 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 2001) (holding, in DWI

prosecution, that it was not error to allow the People to reopen their case and clarify that
the parking lot in fact had four or more spaces-a requirement to show that the crime was
committed in public, rather than on private property-when the People had neglected to
adduce proof at trial that the parking lot had four or more parking spaces).
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2. Fairnessto the Trial Court22
At the heart of an appellant's brief is a claim (or several)
that some sort of error was committed at the trial level. Usually
the source of the error is the trial judge. For example, he or she
wrongly sat a biased juror for cause, failed to dismiss a legally
insufficient case after the prosecution's case-in-chief,
erroneously admitted evidence, gave incorrect instructions to the
jury, or did not follow the proper procedure at sentencing.
Reversals are embarrassing for a trial judge; they signify that he
or she committed an error. Preservation ensures that the trial
judge was at least presented with an opportunity to correct the
error. A trial court that persists with an erroneous decision
cannot later claim unfair surprise.
3. PreventingIntentionalSandbagging-theAce in the Hole2 3
Without a preservation rule, a trial attorney might
intentionally keep quiet about an error with the hope of using it,
in the event of a loss at trial, as a basis for reversal on appeal.
For example, if the judge fails to charge the jury on an essential
element of the crime, the defense attorney might keep silent and
simply make his usual arguments (on the other elements) to the
jury. If he wins an acquittal, double jeopardy applies and retrial
is impossible. If his client is convicted, he has an automatic
winning claim on appeal. For claims where retrial is possible,
such a strategy, absent a requirement of preservation, "would
make litigation practically interminable," 24 ensuring a successful
appeal, reversal, and new trial in every case, only to be followed
by another round of the same.

22. See Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254; Campbell, supra n. 3, at 93; Gillespie, supra n. 18,
at 43.
23. See Patterson,347 N.E.2d at 902; Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254; Campbell, supra n.
3, at 92-93; Gillespie, supra n. 18, at 43; Martineau, supra n. 18, at 1030; Paul T.
Wangerin, "Plain Error" and "Fundamental Fairness": Toward a Definition of
Exceptions to the Rules ofProceduralDefault, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 753, 754 (1979).
24. Campbell, supra n. 3, at 93.
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4. Efficiency2 5
Appellate courts are overburdened with too many cases and
too few judges and staff to dispose of them. 26 Preservation
promotes efficiency by requiring assertions of error to be made,
in the first instance, at the trial level. If the trial court agrees
with the argument, the court can correct the error or ameliorate
whatever harm was done. This obviates the need to take an
appeal at all. If, on the other hand, the trial court does not
reverse its course, the appellate court nevertheless benefits from
a fully fleshed out record. Preservation ensures that appellate
courts deal with only the most serious issues: those that the
appellant thought important enough to raise at trial and about
which there was some disagreement.
4. Developing a RecorcF
When an objection is lodged, the adversary is alerted to a
potential issue for appeal in the event he wins at trial. The
objection allows him to build a proper factual and legal record in
support of the disputed action. This benefits not just the
adversary (the future appellee) but also the appellant and
appellate court, who are then cognizant of the particular grounds
for the disputed evidence. Absent an objection, a party may not
fully develop the record, because "[c]ompetent trial counsel
always are conscious of hazards of trying to prove that which

25. See Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254; Martineau, supra n. 18, at 1032.
26. Dione Christopher Greene, Student Author, The Federal Courts of Appeals,
Unpublished Decisions, and the "No-Citation Rule", 81 Ind. L.J. 1503, 1505-06 (2006)
(explaining five factors that contribute to the overburdening of the federal courts of
appeals: caseload expansion caused by population growth; new statutory rights; retention
of diversity jurisdiction; crime; and miscellaneous factors such as free legal services and
more lawyers in general, and noting in addition that consequences include an expansion in
judicial staff); Expedited Appeals in Selected State Appellate Courts-Preface,4 J. App.
Prac. & Process 191, 191-93 (2002) (detailing approaches used to combat the "caseload
crisis" in appellate courts, and characterizing crisis as equally significant in state and
federal appellate courts); but see Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics:Explaining the
"Crisis of Volume", 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 101, 102 (2006) (acknowledging
"doomsday clamor" prevalent between 1960 and 1989, but pointing out that federal courts
of appeals were not "hopelessly backlogged" in 2005, and that there was by then no
"panicky sense of being overwhelmed").
27. See Jones, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 254; Martineau, supran. 18, at 1031.
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does not have to be proven and of appearing to waste the court's
time in so doing. 2 8
For states that require preservation, the rule can have a
significant impact for prisoners who seek federal habeas corpus
review. 29 If a state appellate court finds a claim to be
unpreserved, that finding serves as a procedural bar to habeas
relief, unless the defendant can show cause and prejudice for the
failure to object.30 The procedural bar thus prevents the federal
court from analyzing the merits of the petitioner's claim.3 1
C. Reasonsfor Failureto Comply with Preservation
Despite the clarity of the preservation doctrine and the
strong policy reasons underlying it, unpreserved claims are
routinely raised in appellate proceedings. There are three
reasons for this phenomenon. First, defendants are typically
represented by new attorneys at the appellate level. While
combing through and scrutinizing the record, these appellate
specialists are more likely to uncover claims of error. These
points may have been missed by their trial counterparts during
the "heat of the battle" of the trial. Second, trial counsel may
have simply been ignorant about the law. 3 2 Third, sometimes the
law changes between the trial and appeal, and counsel seeks to
apply the new law retroactively.33
28. Martineau, supra n. 18, at 1031.
29. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
30. See e.g. Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding New York's
preservation rule an independent and adequate bar to relief).
31. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30.

32. See e.g. Wangerin, supra n. 23, at 753:
Ignorance in this context needs little elucidation. Ignorance of a procedural rule
that requires defense counsel to raise certain defenses before trial may result, for
example, in an objection or motion being made too late to be effective. Or,
during the trial itself, counsel may either fail to notice an error made by
opposing counsel or may be unaware of the ramifications of the error.
Consequently, counsel may fail to make a timely objection to the error.
(footnote omitted).
33. Recently, for example, the New York Court of Appeals overruled decades of its
own precedent and declared "depraved indifference" to be a culpable mental state. See
People v. Feingold,852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006). Previously, in People v. Register, 457
N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983), which was overruled by Feingold,the Court of Appeals held that
the phrase "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" referred
only to the attendant circumstances of the defendant's crime (usually murder) and not to
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Sometimes trial attorneys do not raise claims for strategic
reasons. These can be divided into two categories: appellate and
trial. The appellate strategy is the "ace-in-the-hole" approach I
mentioned earlier. The trial attorney deliberately chooses not
raise a winning argument or objection because he wants to keep
it in reserve (for appeal) in case he does not win at trial. The trial
attorney's focus is on the appeal. In contrast, some strategic
decisions contemplate not making objections or raising claims
during the trial in the hopes that allowing the error to go forward
will help to win an acquittal on the merits at the trial level. For
example, counsel may not object to certain questions on direct
examination of a prosecution witness in the hopes that the
questions will "open up fertile ground for cross-examination." 34
Another strategic consideration is to avoid appearing
obstinate or annoing, particularly in front of a jury, by
objecting too often. As a result, a defense attorney may forego
making certain, minor, but sustainable, objections in order to
appear reasonable and give particular emphasis to the objections
he does make.

III. THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK APPROACHES TO
UNPRESERVED QUESTIONS ON APPEAL

Although the general rule is to require preservation, there
are exceptions. Sometimes courts will review unpreserved
claims. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the New
York State Criminal Procedure Law are examples of two very
different ways of approaching the question of whether to grant
an exception to the preservation rule.

his mental state. Id. at 278. The Court of Appeals has now held that this change in the law
could be applied retroactively to cases in the direct appeal pipeline, see People v. JeanBaptiste, 901 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 2008), but not to cases on collateral review where the
conviction had become final, see Policano v. Herbert,859 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2006).
In general, cases pending on direct appeal will get the benefit of new decisions
issued since the time of trial. See e.g. Griffith v. Ky., 479 U.S. 314 (1987). However, cases
that have become final and are now in "collateral review" will be determined under the old
law unless certain exceptions are met. See e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
34. Wangerin, supran. 23, at 754.
3 5. Id.
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A. The FederalRule: "PlainError"
The federal courts have an escape valve in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(b) that allows appellate courts to
consider unpreserved claims. The rule states very simply that
"[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered
even though it was not brought to the court's attention."3 6 When
adopted in 1944, this was meant to be a "restatement of existing
law."3 7
The plain error rule was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1896, when in Wiborg v. United States3 8 a private
vessel's captain and mates were found guilty of launching a
private military expedition against Cuba. The Court affirmed the
captain's conviction. However, it reversed the convictions of the
mates, finding there was no evidence that they had knowledge of
the military nature of their voyage when they left the United
States. Although this argument was not raised at trial, the Court
noted that it had the power to reverse the conviction nonetheless:
"[I]f a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital
to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it."39
Citing Wiborg, the Supreme Court later reversed the
conviction in Clyatt v. United States40 even though no motion
41
was made for a directed verdict of acquittal. In support of its
plain error review, the Court noted that it had a duty to hold the
Government to proving all of the elements of a crime, if only to
ensure public confidence in the justice system.42
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
37. Id, advisory comm. nn. (1944). Note that in 2002, a minor technical amendment
was made to the rule, which formerly stated that a "plain error or defect" (emphasis added)
could be noticed even though no objection was made at trial. There was confusion in the
lower courts about whether this was meant to be a disjunctive rule. Some courts held that
the rule applied to both "plain errors" and "defects" in the trial court proceedings. The
Supreme Court clarified that this was not the case. See U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993) (indicating that it is "surely wrong" to read Rule 52(b) in the disjunctive). The rule
was amended in 2002 to clarify this ambiguity by striking the words "or defect" from the
text. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), advisory comm. nn. (2002).
38. 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
39. Id. at 658.
40. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
41. Id at 221-22.
42. Id. at 222 ("Only in the exact administration of the law will justice in the long run
be done, and the confidence of the public in such administration be maintained").
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In United States v. Atkinson, 43 a civil case, the Supreme
Court began to add some detail to the plain error rule, noting
that "[t]he verdict of the jury will not ordinarily be set aside for
error not brought to the attention of the trial court."" The
reasons for this general rule are "fairness to the court and to the
parties" and the "public interest" in bringing case to a swift end
after the parties have had a fair opportunity to present their
claims of law and fact.45 But while the Court declined to
consider the claim as plain error in Atkinson, it made an
important comment about when plain error should be
recognized:
In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own
motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken,
if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.4 6
Without stating why, the Court summarily concluded that "no
such case is presented here."4 7
Thus, Atkinson's dictum introduced a number of important
points about plain error review. First, it is to be exercised only in
exceptional circumstances; it is the exception, not the rule.
Second, such exceptional circumstances are more likely to be
found in criminal cases, where the issue is a defendant's life or
liberty. Third, there is a public interest component to the
analysis. Plain errors affect the "fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings" and thus, in the "public
interest," appellate courts "may" notice the errors. Fourth, plain
error can be recognized even on a court's own motion.
As noted in its Advisory Committee notes, Rule 52(b) was
designed to be a codification or restatement of this existing law.
Yet, the rule contains no discussion of Atkinson's "exceptional
circumstances" or other criteria for the exercise of appellate
court discretion. Thus, the plain error rule continued to be

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

297 U.S. 157 (1936).
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fleshed out by judicial decision. In United States v. Frady, a
prisoner brought a collateral attack against his conviction for
murder, claiming error in the trial court's jury instructions after
having made no objection to those instructions at trial. The
Supreme Court considered whether Rule 52(b)'s plain error rule
or the established "cause and actual prejudice" test of habeas
law should be used, and concluded that Rule 52(b) should not be
used to review these unpreserved claims: Rule 52(b) "was
intended for use on direct appeal," and it is "out of place" for
collateral attacks after a judgment has become final.50
In passing, the Frady Court made a number of comments
about Rule 52(b)'s application on direct appeal: It was intended
to ensure that litigants have "a means for the prompt redress of
miscarriages of justice," and it applies only when the error was
"so 'plain"' that the trial court and prosecutor "were derelict in
countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance
in detecting it."5 1 It also reflects a "careful balancing" between
the Court's intention of "encourag[ing] all trial participants to
seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around" and the
Court's "insistence that obvious injustice be promptly
redressed."5 2 However, plain error is to be used "spariny,"
only when a "miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.'
In dissent, Justice Brennan wrote about Rule 52(b) as a
"fundamental" part of the court system's obligation to correct
substantial miscarriages of justice. 54 The rule "mitigates the
harsh impact of the adversarial system" by recognizing that the
defendant is at the mercy of his trial attorney and must rely on
him or her to make proper objections. 5 It also ensures that
48. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
49. See, for example, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), in which the Court held
that a federal court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner whose claim is procedurally
defaulted (by, for example, failing to comply with a state's contemporaneous objection or
preservation rule) only if he can demonstrate "cause" for the default and "prejudice"
thereby. See also e.g. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-32.

50. Frady, 456 U.S. at 164 (noting "society's legitimate interest in the finality of the
judgment" once it "has been perfected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct
review or by the affirmance of the conviction on appeal").
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id
53. Id at n. 14.
54. Id at 179.
55. Id. at 180.
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prosecutors take seriously their obligations to ensure defendants
receive fair trials, by requiring them to intervene to protect
defendants from the mistakes of their counsel.5 6 Accordingly, he
would have applied plain error to the defendant's claim.
Without providing a clear test for plain error, the Court
continued to apply Rule 52(b) in specific cases. In United States
v. Young,5 7 the purported error concerned certain statements by
the prosecutor during his rebuttal argument to which no
objection was made at trial. On appeal, the Government claimed
that the prosecutor's remarks were an "invited response" to
defense counsel's own closing argument. Because there was no
objection at trial, the issue was not whether there was error by
the prosecutor in making the argument and by the court in not
correcting it,58 but whether there was "plain error" under Rule
52(b). The Court quoted language from both Frady and Atkinson
indicating that the rule should be used "sparingly" and only for
particularly serious errors, and that it should not be subject to
"unwarranted extension." 59 The entire record must be reviewed
so that any errors can be viewed in their proper context, because
a plain error analysis is not a "quest for error." 60 Applying these
general principles to the prosecutorial misconduct in the
defendant's trial, the Court concluded that the Government's
argument, "although inappropriate," did not "undermine the
fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage
of justice." 6 1 One of the reasons for this conclusion was the
"overwhelming evidence" of the defendant's guilt. 62
Finally, in 1992, the Supreme Court provided what
purported to be a workable definition and rule for plain error
analysis. United States v. Olano63 involved an acknowledged
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), which
requires the discharge of alternate jurors once deliberations have
begun. At trial, no objection was made when the trial court
56. Id.
57. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
58. In fact, the Court concluded that both errors were present. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 15 (quoting Frady).
60. Id. at 16 (quoting Johnson v. U.S., 318 U.S. 189, 202 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
6 1. Id.
62. Id. at 19.
63. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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permitted the alternate jurors to sit in the jury room during
deliberations but admonished them not to participate. The issue,
then, was whether this was plain error.
For the first time, the Court announced a rule by which to
determine whether a case satisfies the plain error rule. The Court
initially noted that the authority of an appellate court to notice
unpreserved error is "circumscribed" and that ultimately the
decision of whether to correct an alleged error is within the
discretion of the court. 64
Next, the Court announced a four-part rule for determining
the existence of plain error. 65 First, there must be an error. An
error occurs when a legal rule has been violated and the
defendant did not waive the rule through an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.66 Second, the error must be
"plain," meaning "clear" or "obvious" under current law. 67
Third, the plain error must affect "substantial rights," which
means that the error must have been prejudicial: "It must have
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." 68 A court
applying the Olano rule conducts the same type of analysis as if
an objection had been made and it was applying the harmless
error rule of Rule 52(a) to determine whether the error was
prejudicial. 69
Thus, if the first three requirements are met, a reviewing
court moves to the fourth and discretionary part of the test. An
appellate court is not bound to correct every plain error. Rather,
the Olano Court held, in language borrowed from Young and

64. Id. at 732.
65. The Court noted that the first three parts of the rule act as "limitations on appellate
authority under Rule 52(b)." Id. at 734.
66. Id. at 733-34. Waiver is distinguished from forfeiture. Forfeiture is the "failure to
make the timely assertion of a right." The failure to object does not, by itself, turn an error
into a non-error. In contrast, most legal rights can be intentionally, knowingly, and
voluntarily waived. Waiver can cure many legal errors. Id
67. Id. at 734.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 734-35. (explaining that difference between Rule 52(a) analysis, which
occurs only if the error was preserved, and analysis under Rule 52(b), when there was no
objection, is in burden of proof: government burden of showing that harmless error applies
under Rule 52(a) and defendant burden of showing that his substantial rights were affected
under Rule 52(b)). The Olano Court did not address whether there is some class of errors
so fundamental that a defendant need not show that a different outcome would have
occurred but for the error. Id. at 735.
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Frady, that it should correct errors only "in those circumstances
in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result."70
Although the Olano Court explicitly identified only cases in
which the error caused the conviction of an innocent defendant
as those in which a court of appeals "should no doubt correct a
plain forfeited error," 71 actual innocence is not the only reason
for a court to exercise its discretionary authority under Rule
52(b). 72 Quoting Atkinson, the Olano Court held that an
appellate court should use its discretion when the error
"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."7 3 An error may meet this standard
"independent of the defendant's innocence." 74
Applying this four-part test in Olano, the Court found that
there was unquestionably an error: Rule 24(c) requires the
discharge of alternate jurors after the jury has begun its
deliberations, and waiver could not apply because the
Government conceded the plain error. The key inquiry was
whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. But
there was no evidence of prejudice, 5 and a violation of Rule
24(c) is not of such a magnitude that affects substantial rights
"independent of its prejudicial impact., 76 Because substantial
rights were not affected, the Court declined to address whether,
if the error was prejudicial, the Court of Appeals should have
exercised its discretion under the fourth prong of the test to
correct the error.77
In Johnson v. UnitedStates, the Court answered a number
of questions left open by Olano. The defendant in Johnson was
convicted of perjury before a grand jury, the issue being whether

70. Id at 736 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15, and Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 n. 14).
71. Id
72. Id. (stating that "we have never held that a Rule 52(b) remedy is only warranted in
cases of actual innocence") (emphasis in original).
73. Id. (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160).
74. Id. at 736-37.
75. Prejudice probably could have been shown if the alternates participated in the
deliberations, either verbally or with their "body language," or the alternates' mere
presence in the jury room may have had a "chilling effect" on the regular jurors. See id. at
739. But the Court held that neither showing was made in Olano. See id. at 739-40.
76. Id. at 738.
77. Id. at 741.
78. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
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those lies were material. Consistent with the law and practice at
the time, the trial judge decided the issue of materiality, rather
than submitting it to the jury to decide. Presumably because the
law was settled at the time of trial defense counsel did not
object to the trial judge's instruction.i After the conviction, but
before Johnson's appeal, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Gaudin,80 in which it declared unconstitutional the
practice of not submitting the materiality element to the jury.
Initially, the Johnson Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the error was "structural" and not subject to plain
error analysis under Rule 52(b). Rather, it noted that Rule 52(b)
and Olano's carefully constructed rule govern the analysis of
unpreserved claims on direct appeal in the federal courts, while
the cases cited by the defendant concerning structural error arose
from state prosecutions, either on certiorari to the state courts or
on federal habeas corpus.8
The Johnson Court then applied the Olano test: First, there
was error because Gaudin requires submission of the materiality
element to the jury. A new rule, such as the one announced in
Gaudin, applies to all cases in the direct appeal pipeline.8 2 The
Court had a more difficult time with the second prong-whether
the error was plain. The question was whether this is to be
analyzed under the law current at the time of the appeal or the
law that existed at the time of trial. The Johnson Court held that
"in a case such as this-where the law at the time of trial was
settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is
enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate
consideration." 83 To hold otherwise would require defense
counsel to make "a long and virtually useless laundry list of
objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing
precedent." 84 Finding the existence of error that was also plain,
the Court then turned to the question of whether it affected
substantial rights, again rejecting the defendant's argument that
this was a "structural error" and therefore immune from a
79. Id. at 463.

80. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
81. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466.

82. Griffith v. Ky., 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
83. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468.
84. Id.
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"substantial rights" analysis.8 5 It analogized the error to the
giving of incorrect jury instructions, not the denial of a structural
right like the right to be free from self-incrimination or to
receive a reasonable doubt instruction.86
Nevertheless, the Johnson Court declined to go further in
its substantial rights and prejudice analysis. Instead, it found that
the error in question did not warrant discretionary relief under
the fourth prong of Olano. Here, the evidence of the defendant's
guilt was overwhelming and the question of materiality was
"essentially uncontroverted at trial." The Court went on:
On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings."' Indeed, it would be the
reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that
effect. "Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the
judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process
and bestirs the public to ridicule it."88
Johnson thus provides several important clarifications to
the Olano rule. First, following Griffith, a step one "error" is
found if the law subsequently changes while the case is in the
direct appeal pipeline, even if the trial court correctly applied the
law that existed at the time of trial. Second, an error is "plain"
even if it only becomes so as a result of a subsequent, post-trial
change in the law. Third, "structural errors," for which no
"substantial rights" analysis must be undertaken, are extremely
limited in number. Fourth, courts undertaking a plain error
analysis can skip over the third step of Olano and decide that,
even if there was a violation of substantial rights, it should not
exercise its discretion under the fourth step of the test.
Regarding that discretion, when the evidence of a defendant's
guilt is overwhelming, technical errors affecting undisputed
elements of a crime should not result in reversal.
There appears to be a narrow category of cases in which
courts will reverse despite the lack of contemporaneous
85. Recall that the defendant in Olano made a similar argument. See Olano, 507 U.S. at
737-40 (discussing whether Olano involved an error that could be presumed to affect
substantial rights absent a showing of prejudice).
86. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469.
87. Id at 470.
88. Id. (quoting Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error50 (Ohio St. U. Press
1970)).
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objection, but without conducting a plain error analysis. Nguyen
v. United States8 9 was such an anomalous case. Because the
defendants were convicted in Guam, their appeal was heard by
the Ninth Circuit, where their panel, composed of the chief
judge of the Ninth Circuit, a senior judge of the Ninth Circuit,
and the chief judge of the District Court for the Northern
Mariana Islands, 90 unanimously affirmed the convictions.91
On certiorari, the defendants challenged the judgment
because of the Article IV judge on their panel,92 even though
defense counsel knew for approximately a week before oral
arguments that he would be included on the panel and did not
object. The Supreme Court ordered a new appeal, but decided
not to use Rule 52(b) to do so. The Court held that plain error
was not appropriate because using it in such a case would
incorrectly suggest that some action (or inaction) on
petitioners' part could create authority Congress has quite
specifically withheld. Even if the parties had expressly
stipulated to the participation of a non-Article III judge in
the consideration of their appeals, no matter how
distinguished and well qualified the judge might be, such a
stipulation would not have cured the plain defect in the
composition of the panel. 93
Moreover, because the error involved enforcement of a
statute that "embodies a strong policy concerning the proper
administration of judicial process"-the composition of
appellate panels-assessment of prejudice was improper.9 4

89. 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
90. The chief judge of the Ninth Circuit had invited the Northern Mariana judge to sit
by designation, apparently not realizing that he was not an Article III judge but instead held
office pursuant to Article IV. Id. at 72-73.
91. 284 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).
92. Nguyen, 539 U.S. 73-74.
93. Id. at 80-81 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). The dissent criticized the
majority's failure to undertake a Rule 52(b) analysis, distinguishing cases in which the
Court had, in the past, reversed judgments of improperly composed Court of Appeals
panels. See id at 86.
94. Id. at 81 (citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)).
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B. The New York Rule: "InterestofJustice"
1. New York's System of Appellate Courts95
New York has a two-tiered appellate process, involving
both intermediate courts and the Court of Appeals, which is the
state's highest court. The first step is an intermediate appellate
court, to which there is an automatic right to an appeal. Felony
appeals are heard in the Supreme Court's Appellate Division,
which is administratively divided into four departments.
Depending
on where they originate geographically,
misdemeanor appeals are heard in either a county court or in the
Appellate Term of the Supreme Court.
There is no appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals9 6
except in death penalty cases, and outside that single class of
cases the Court of Appeals is limited to hearing questions of
law.91 It cannot consider questions of fact and, unlike the
intermediate appellate courts, it does not have interest-of-justice
95. Readers already familiar with appellate practice in New York may wish to proceed
directly to section III(B)(2), infra.

96. A losing party in an intermediate appellate court can, however, seek leave from
either a judge of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Appellate Division to appeal to the
Court of Appeals. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 450.90 (Westlaw 2010) (outlining appeals
process and referring to the certificate granting leave to appeal described in N.Y. Crim.
Proc. L. § 460.20). An applicant can seek leave only once, from either the Court of Appeals
or the Appellate Division, but not both. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. §§ 460.15-460.25
(Westlaw 2010). Leave to appeal is rarely granted. See New York City Bar, Report of the
Criminal Justice Operations Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Concerning Criminal Leave Application Procedures in the Court of Appeals,

http://www. nycbar. org /pdf/report uploads/20071837- Report onCrimialLeaveApplication
Procedures.pdf at § 2 (noting that, on average, only about two percent of applications are
granted) (accessed Jan. 21, 2011; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). Although this is not stated in any statute, the Court of Appeals has said it looks
for cases of statewide importance. For example, cases raising a split in the Departments of
the Appellate Division or otherwise showing a conflict in the law are more likely to receive
a grant of leave. See Stuart M. Cohen, Clerk of Court, N.Y. Ct. of App., Criminal
Jurisdictionand PracticeOutline, http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/forms/claoutline.htm at
§ VIII(B) (giving examples) (accessed Jan. 21, 2011; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
97. New York's death penalty law, while still on the books, is not enforced because of
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) (holding death penalty statute
unconstitutional). Nevertheless, capital cases bypass the intermediate appellate courts
altogether. Review is directly from the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in capital cases, to reverse on the law, on the facts, or in
the interest of justice. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 450.70 (Westlaw 2010).
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jurisdiction. The intermediate appellate courts, on the other
hand, have authority to reverse or modify convictions on the
law, on the facts, or "[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of
justice.

98

A question of law is presented only if it was properlX'
preserved by a contemporaneous protest at the trial court level. 9
Apart from the mode-of-proceedings errors, which never require
preservation, 00 the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to
consider unpreserved questions. This is codified in both the state
Constitution' and by statute.102
2. Application of the New York Rule
Like the federal courts, New York places great emphasis on
preservation. It is the general rule; unpreserved claims are only
rarely considered by the courts in New York.10 3
Nevertheless, New York courts have recognized a category
of errors-dubbed "mode of proceedings" errors-that are so
serious that preservation is not required and they may be raised
These include violation of
at any time, including on appeal.
05
of the right to be
deprivation
jeopardy,
from
double
protection
present at important court proceedings, 0 6 and improper
delegation of a judicial duty to a court officer.1o7 These

examples are categorical in nature. A defendant raising one of
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.15(3)(a)-(c) (Westlaw 2010).
N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.05(2) (Westlaw 2009).
See Subsection III(B)(2), infra.
See N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(a).
See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. §470.35 (Westlaw 2010).
See e.g. Thomas R. Newman & Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Threshold Issues:

Objections, Harmless Error,Review Guides, N.Y.L.J. at 3 (Jan. 6, 2009) (declaring that

"[w]ith certain limited exceptions, issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered as grounds for a reversal or modification").
104. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 902 ("There is one very narrow exception to the
requirement of a timely objection. A defendant in a criminal case cannot waive, or even
consent to, error that would affect the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings
prescribed by law.").
105. E.g. People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 2010).
106. E.g. People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. 1992).

107. E.g. People v. Pizarro,594 N.Y.S.2d 159, 159 (App. Div., Ist Dept. 1993) (noting
that "appellate review of a trial court's improper use of a court clerk 'to instruct' the jury
foreperson concerning the verdict sheet would not be precluded by a defendant's failure to
object thereto," but declining to undertake review in the absence of a proper record).
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these claims need not demonstrate that his specific circumstance
warrants reversal. It is sufficient that he raises the claim itself.
Apart from mode-of-proceedings errors, a party raising an
unpreserved question on appeal has only one other alternative:
to plead for the intermediate appellate court to reverse or modify
"in the interest of justice."'o
The intermediate appellate courts in New York, then, have
greater jurisdiction and power than the state's highest court.
They can reverse or modify a judgment "[u]pon the law,"
"[u]pon the facts," or "[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest
of justice," or on any combination of grounds.109 Modifications
or reversals on unpreserved questions specifically fall under the
"as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice" prong:
The kinds of determinations of reversal or modification
deemed to be made as a matter of discretion in the interest
ofjustice include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) That an error or defect occurred at a trial resulting
in a judgment, which error or defect was not duly
protested at trial as prescribed in [CPL § 470.05(2)]
so as to present a question of law, deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and
(b) That a sentence, though legal, was unduly harsh or
severe. 110
Thus, the only qualification is that the unpreserved error must
have resulted in an unfair trial. Otherwise, like its federal
counterpart, CPL § 470.15 provides no guidance regarding when
an unpreserved issue should be considered "as a matter of
discretion in the interest of justice." "Interest of justice" is not
defined anywhere in the statute.
Unlike federal Rule 52(b), which had life breathed into it
by Olano's four-part test, there is no corresponding test at the
state level. Decisions reversing or modifying in the interest of
justice confirm this standardless rule. Only rarely does an
108. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.15(6).
109. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.15(3).
110. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.15(6).
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intermediate appellate court explain why it is flexing its interest-

of-justice muscle; it simply says that it is doing so. For a classic
example of this conclusory assertion of power, in People v.
Friedman,"' the Second Department used this language in its
holding:
The defendant correctly contends that his conviction ...
must be vacated. The evidence was legally insufficient to
establish his guilt as the People failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed "a written
instrument which has been falsely made, completed or
altered" .

. .

. Although this issue is unpreserved, we reach

it in the exercise of our discretion in the interest of

justice.11 2
The last sentence of this paragraph is the sole discussion of
why the court was reversing despite the lack of preservation.113
The court's lone citation, to People v. Lowery," is not helpful
to discerning a meaning for "interest of justice." Like Friedman,
Lowery involved a reversal because of legally insufficient
evidence. And in Friedman, as in Lowery, the claim was not
preserved. The Friedman court's only response was, "Although
unpreserved, we reach this issue in the interest of justice (see,
CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).""' 5 Other similar cases are equally
unhelpful in providing a standard or test for the exercise of
discretion.116 In much the same way, cases in which a court does
not exercise its discretionary authority are usually met with a
simple declaration that "we decline to review [the claim] in the
interest of justice."" 7
Rarely, however, a court will give reasons for its decision
on the interest-of-justice question. Like the federal courts, New
York's intermediate appellate courts will decide unpreserved
issues if doing so will exonerate an innocent person. In People v.
Ramos,1 8 for example, the trial judge stated on the record that
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
Butler,
117.
118.

789 N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 2005).
Id. at 250 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Id.
680 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1998).
Id. at 253.
See e.g. People v. Dunbar, 713 N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 2000); People v.

711 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2000).
See e.g. People v. Valdivia, 885 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2009).
308 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1970).
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he believed the jury's guilty verdict was erroneous and the
defendant was in fact innocent.11 9 Nevertheless, he did not state
his reasons on the record or set aside the verdict.120 The lack of a
record was particularly problematic for the appellate court since,
without the judge's stated reasons, there was nothing to review.
The Appellate Division therefore turned to its interest-of-justice
power, describing it as "broad" and stated that it should be
exercised "in accordance with the conscience of the court and
with due regard to the interests of the defendant and those of
society." 12 1 The court stated that it had to look not only at the
facts of the particular case but also to its "duty to correct any
situation which casts a doubt upon the proper functioning of the
courts in the administration of justice"l122 -a statement
remarkably similar to that in Olano and other cases talking about
the fourth step of the federal plain error rule. Applying these
principles to Ramos, the First Department found that allowing
the guilty verdict to stand would cast such a "doubt" on the
justice system because of the inconsistency between the jury's
verdict and the trial court's statements of the defendant's
innocence. 12 3 In the absence of "clear and convincing evidence"
of guilt that could remove this doubt, reversal was required.124
Similarly, in People v. Kidd,12 5 the defendant was
convicted of robbery in the second degree. The evidence against
the accused was sparse: testimony of a single witness (the
victim) who had only a "fleeting" opportunity to observe the
defendant during the crime, but who identified the defendant on
the street a few days after the incident.126 There was some alibi
evidence and the defendant had only a minor criminal record.
119. Id. at 196.
120. Id. at 197.
121. Id at 198.
122. Id
123. Id at 198-99. This doubt was "accentuated" by the trial court's encouragement to
the defendant to seek a pardon or other remedy from the governor. Id.
124. Id. at 199. A dissenting judge would have held that the lack of record evidence
prohibited the exercise of discretion. Id. (McNally, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the
majority for "speculat[ing], assum[ing] and decid[ing] the issue in a vacuum," id., asserted
that the case turned on questions of credibility, and noted that the jury's verdict implied a
credibility finding in favor of the People's witnesses that should not have been disturbed,
id. at 199-200.
125. 431 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1980).
126. Id. at 543.
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Nevertheless, the court found the evidence of guilt legally
sufficient.127 Moreover, the court held that the verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence.128 Still, the court reversed the
conviction on interest-of-justice grounds. Whatever the meaning
of its interest-of-justice jurisdiction, "[W]e think we do not
overstep the line when we exercise our 'interest of justice'
powers on the basis of so fundamental a consideration as guilt or
innocence." After quoting from People v. Ramos, the First
Department held, "[O]n balance we are left with a very
disturbing feeling that guilt has not been satisfactorily
established; that there is a grave risk that an innocent man has
been convicted; and that we should therefore not let this

conviction stand."

29

At least one case seemed to hold that a cumulative effect
from multiple errors can warrant interest-of-justice reversal even
if, in isolation, single errors were not prejudicial. In People v.
Langford,130 the appellate court pointed to a number of errors:
prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination and
summation; an incomplete charge to the jury on alibi; a close
question on identity evidence; and insufficient evidence that the
victim sustained a "physical injury," as required for a
conviction. 13 1 Regarding preservation, the court stated that
[w]hile many of the errors complained of were not objected
127. Id at 543-44. There was no question that a robbery was committed. When viewed
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the People's evidence-the complainant's
testimony-made out a prima facie case for robbery in the second degree.
128. Id. at 545. I find this conclusion troublesome. Weight-of-the-evidence analysis
requires an intermediate appellate court to
determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable. If so, the
court must weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may
be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions. Based
on the weight of the credible evidence, the court then decides whether the jury
was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt....
Essentially, the court sits as a thirteenth juror and decides which facts were
proven at trial.
People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348 (N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted). Kidd does not
explain why the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence-after all, the court's
characterization of the evidence of identity as "troublesome" is the classic case for weight
of the evidence reversal-other than to say, "[W]e cannot say the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence in the accepted legal sense." Kidd, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
129. Kidd, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
130. 545 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1989).
131. Id. at 610-12.
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to at trial, we nevertheless feel compelled, under the
circumstances of this case, to reach them in the interest of
justice and to reverse the judgment of conviction.... The

cumulative harmful effect of the various errors cannot be
doubted.132
Interest-of-justice power is also used by intermediate
appellate courts to reduce otherwise lawful sentences that they
deem excessive.1 33 Nevertheless, a defendant's voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will
foreclose an interest-of-justice review of his or her sentence on
excessiveness grounds.
On the other hand, some decisions explain why the courts
are not exercising their interest-of-justice jurisdiction. The
typical reason is the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt,135 but even here, the explanation is often sparse. For
example, in Belgrave, one of the issues was a purported error in
the verdict sheet.136 The Second Department, in affirming,
simply held that:
the defendant's contention that the verdict sheet submitted
to the jury was not proper is not preserved for appellate
review as a matter of law since the defendant failed to
object to its submission . . .. We decline to exercise our
interest of justice jurisdiction to review the defendant's
claim iven the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt.1-

Some opinions answer the interest-of-justice question by
lookinF to see if the error affected the fairness of the defendant's
trial.13 They do so, however, by looking at the error in. the
context of the weight of evidence against the defendant,' 39 and
here, too, the analysis can be conclusory. But a 1973 decision
132. Id. at 610, 611 (citation omitted).
133. See e.g. People v. Perino, 907 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010). This
power is specifically codified in N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.15(6)(b) (referring to a sentence
that is "unduly harsh or severe").
134. People v. Lopez, 844 N.E.2d 1145 (N.Y. 2006).
135. See e.g. People v. Belgrave, 580 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1992).
136. Id. at 738.
137. Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).
138. See e.g. People v. King, 482 N.Y.S.2d 924, 925 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1984) (noting
that court will address interest-of-justice question "only where error is so egregious that it
deprives defendant of a fair trial").
139. See e.g. id. (itemizing evidence of defendant's fraud against insurer).
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from the First Department noted how important the weight of
the evidence is in assessing whether to reverse in the interest of
justice. At issue in People v. Cornishl40 was whether the
prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant. During the
examination, the trial judge asked defense counsel if he wanted
to object. Defense counsel declined. After first noting the
overwhelming evidence of guilt, the appellate court went on:
[N]ot only was there no objection, but the court invited
objection from defense counsel and the invitation was
refused. We are asked to reverse nevertheless in "the
interests of justice". This naturally raises the question of
just what are the interests of justice in such a situation. If
justice is more interested in a technically perfect trial than
in one in which a proper result is reached, then the interests
of justice would indicate a reversal. Here we have no way
of knowing what prompted counsel to allow the improper
testimony to pass without objection. He might well, in the
absence of any other viable contention, have hoped to

capitalize on the District Attorney's overzealousness to
obtain a sympathetic response from the jury. But, whatever
may be the reason, we cannot see that an appellate court is
required to overlook the omission where guilt is clear.141
Some decisions employ a harmless error framework when
analyzing a preservation question. In People v. Elcock,14 2 the
appellate court gave two reasons for not reversing in the interest
of justice. Although the trial court did not give an alibi charge to
the jury, this purported error was unpreserved because defense
counsel did not request an alibi charge. The court found no
reason to exercise its discretion to reach the issue in the interest
of justice. First, there was "strong evidence of the defendant's
guilt."l 43 Second, "the trial court's instructions, when taken as a
whole, properly instructed the jury that the People bore the
burden of proof as to the complicity of the defendant in the
charged crimes."1 44 Thus, the court implied that the jury charge
cured any possible prejudice to the defendant.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

349 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1973).
Id. at 695-96.
516 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2d Dept.).
Id. at 20.
Id.
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Secondary authorities provide little help in articulating a
standard in this area. One encyclopedia provides a list of
instances in which intermediate appellate courts have reviewed
unpreserved questions 45 but does not synthesize a workable
rule, other than to state that courts will not reverse in the interest
of justice if the evidence was overwhelming' 46 but will exercise
their discretionary jurisdiction if the cumulative effect of the
errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial.14 7
Commentators emphasize how rarely an intermediate
appellate court will review an unpreserved question. One
veteran appellate practitioner opined, "Experience also indicates
that the Appellate Divisions do not frequently exercise this
discretionary power." 48 Another team of experts said that a
court will only "rarely" exercise its interest-of-justice
jurisdiction.' 4 9 "[Ilt all depends on the facts of the case and 5how
0
sympathetic the court feels toward the appellant's position."',
C. Comparingthe Two Rules
At first blush, the federal and New York courts would seem
to take radically different positions in the handling of
unpreserved questions. New York's rule is discretionary and
fact-specific in every case. There is no standard other than the
"interest of justice." This "standard" gives no guidance to the
courts that have to apply it on a daily basis. Worse, since only
the intermediate appellate courts have this discretion, there is no
guidance from the State's highest court, the Court of Appeals,
let alone a check from that court on the improper exercise of
interest-of-justice discretion. Finally, the Appellate Division and
other intermediate appellate courts have not given detailed
treatment to the question. As I have demonstrated above, there
are a few basic principles that can be cherry-picked from
isolated statements in a handful of decisions: Discretion should
145. 34B N. Y.Jur.2d Criminal Law: Procedure

§ 3589

(Westlaw 2010).

146. Id at n. 17.
147. Id. at n. 18.
148. Norman A. Olch, Appellate Court Consideration of Unpreserved Error and
Matters Not in the Record, 242 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Aug. 31, 2009).

149. Newman & Ahmuty, supra n. 103, at 3.
150. Id.
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be exercised to free the innocent; it should not be used to let
defendants off on technical errors where the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming; the cumulative effect of numerous unpreserved
errors on the fairness of a defendant's trial weighs in favor of
reversal; excessive sentences can be reduced without a showing
of abuse of discretion; and the whole record must be examined
to place errors in their proper context. For those who prefer
definite legal rules to give guidance in future cases, the New
York standard fails. For those who prefer an escape-valve to
strict preservation rules and trust courts to exercise their
discretion in an appropriate manner, the interest-of-justice
standard is a perfect rule precisely because it is standardless.
Those who eschew the rudderless interest-of-justice rule
and prefer something more definitive may be tempted to replace
it with something like the federal "plain error" rule because it
seems to provide a structured way of tempering the harshness of
the preservation rule. However, at its core, plain error is nothing
more than a dressed up version of New York's interest-of-justice
rule. There are four hurdles for an appellant to leap over before a
court will reverse on an unpreserved issue: (1) error that is (2)
plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and would result in (4) a
miscarriage of justice if not corrected. The first requirementthe presence of error-is in both rules, although arguably a New
York court could reverse if justice required it, even though there
was no error at all.'' The third requirement, affecting
"substantial right" is also present in New York. In the Criminal
Procedure Law, immediately preceding the general rule of
preservation is the following: "An appellate court must
determine an appeal without regard to technical errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."' 5 2 This
rule essentially states New York's adherence to the principle of
harmless error. Errors that do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties are those upon which the outcome did not turn. 15 3

151. I am hard pressed to imagine a situation in which, limited by the record from the
court of first instance, an intermediate appellate court would reverse a lawful and proper
conviction without finding some error below.
152. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 470.05(1). The preservation rule is contained in N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 470.05(2).
153. See Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d at 794-95.
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Only prejudicial or harmful errors can result in reversal or

modification.1 54
The fourth requirement of Olano's plain error formulation
is markedly similar in language, purpose, and effect to interestof-justice. It focuses on whether the error "seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
Moreover, it is discretionary with the appellate court.'5 5 That
leaves the requirement of plainness as the sole difference
between the jurisdictions' tests.
Arguably, the plainness requirement of the federal rule
would add some value to New York's standard. Errors
predicated on finite or nuanced interpretations of the law are not
"plain." This addresses the fairness concern of preservation. If
error was obvious to the judge and adversary at the time it was
made, they are in a harder position to complain when the issue is
raised on appeal. On the other hand, when the issue requires a
nuanced interpretation of the law, it is not in the "interest of
justice" to excuse preservation, since the adversary and court
cannot be faulted for not anticipating an error that is not clear.
III. TOWARDS A WORKABLE STANDARD
A. Formulatinga Standard
When I first began examining this issue, I tried to identify
the crux of the problem and create a solution around it. At their
core, plain error and interest-of-justice jurisdiction exist as
safety valves to prevent the unjust conviction of criminal
defendants. In turn, these doctrines are necessary because some
defense attorneys-either out of ignorance or strategy-do not
adequately or properly preserve claims on the record.
Thus, my initial thought was to treat unpreserved questions
for what they really are: masked ineffective-assistance-of
counsel claims. Under federal law, a defendant has been
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel if he can prove
that his attorney's performance was "deficient" and that he
154. Id. at 795 (finding that "the nonconstitutional errors which occurred on this
defendant's second trial were harmless").
155. Presumably if the Court of Appeals improvidently exercises its discretion in a case,
the Supreme Court could reverse, but my research has not revealed any such case.
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suffered prejudice as a result.156 In assessing whether
representation was deficient, courts consider whether the
attorney's performance was "reasonable considering all the
circumstances" 15 7 or whether the conduct was "outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance."1 5 8 In particular,
U]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
A fair assessment of attorney
unreasonable....
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
action might be considered sound trial
the challenged
strategy. 159
Applying this standard to unpreserved questions, we can
conclude that an attorney's performance with respect to
preservation will be ineffective only if a reasonable attorney
would have made an objection and there is no legitimate,
strategic explanation for the failure to preserve the claim.
In turn, a defendant would have to show prejudice: that the
failure to object had an "effect on the judgment."' 60In
explaining the reason for requiring prejudice, the Strickland
Court noted:
Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely
to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to
likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 682 (1984).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 689 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 691.
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with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys
correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an
art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one
case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a
defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were
unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they
actually had an adverse effect on the defense.161
Prejudice requires more than a showing that the error had some
"conceivable effect" on the verdict, because "[v]irtually every
act or omission of counsel would meet the test," yet not every
error is so severe that it undermines the judgment itself.' 2
Instead, the test is whether there is a "reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."1 63 Thus, in the preservation context, a defendant
would have to show that the unpreserved claim was nevertheless
meritorious to the extent that there was a "reasonable
possibility" that preservation would have led either to correction
at the trial level or a win on appeal.
At first blush, the Strickland test seems like an ideal
structure for evaluating unpreserved questions. It focuses on the
reasonableness of counsel's conduct at trial. A trial attorney is
not held to the impossible standard of predicting, in the heat of
battle, every conceivable legal issue that could provide for
appellate relief after conviction. Instead, he or she is faulted only
for ignoring obvious errors that a reasonable attorney would
have objected to under the circumstances. Likewise, not every
error would result in a reversal, but only those where there is a
reasonable probability that there would have been a different
outcome. Importantly, the Strickland standard does not fault a
trial attorney for strategic decisions that, in hindsight, may have
been better made; stated another way, if failure of preservation
is on account of a tactical decision, the defendant is not
rewarded for his or his attorney's gamesmanship.
In addition, the Strickland test is a workable and familiar
rule for courts. Appellate courts could, in theory, simply decline
161. Id. at 693.
162. Id.

163. Id. at 694.
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to review any unpreserved question. The failure to make a
proper objection would then become a claim in and of itself. If,
in not objecting, the defense attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel, his or her client--on appeal-would get
the same appellate relief available had the claim been properly
preserved but only if the defendant could satisfy the Strickland
test first.
While attractive, this Strickland approach to handling
unpreserved questions is ultimately problematic because of
several practical concerns. In New York, courts are loath to
review ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal because
they typically involve matters outside the record. For example,
counsel's strategy for not making an objection will ordinarily
not appear on the record. Thus, the defendant would have to
proceed by way of a post-judgment motion to vacate the
judgment. This is problematic because there is no right to
appointed counsel to help defendants litigate such motions.
There are also several procedural bars that may prevent the trial
court from granting relief.165 It would also be an inefficient
course of action, as the appellate process would become
bifurcated and prolonged.
B. A Proposal
I propose that appellate courts continue to exercise their
discretion to review unpreserved questions. The federal plain
error rule provides a useful framework, but I suggest omitting
the requirement that the error affect the substantial rights of the
aggrieved party, because this is nothing more than a statement of
the harmless error rule. Thus, an appellate court should review
an unpreserved question if: (1) there was, in fact, an error; (2)
the error is "plain;" and (3) the interests of justice would be
served by appellate review.
The third prong of the rule should be further defined. The
after-the-fact, case-by-case approach to interest-of-justice
review provides no guidance to courts and litigants. Either the
164. People v. Richardson, 603 N.Y.S.2d 700 (S. Ct. Kings County 1993).
165. See e.g. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. §§ 440.10,440.30 (Westlaw 2010).
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Legislature or the courts themselves should identify the factors

that should be used to determine if the interests of justice
warrant review.
C. FactorsPotentiallyAffecting the "Interest ofJustice"
As a starting point, I propose the following factors for
courts to use: (1) the likelihood of the defendant's innocence; (2)
the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (3) whether
the failure to object appears to have been a tactical decision by
the defense; (4) the public policy interests, if any, at stake in the
claim; (5) whether the claim is legal or factual in nature; (6) the
remedies available to the aggrieved party had the claim been
raised in the first instance; and (7) whether the adversary has
been deprived of an opportunity to make a complete record. If,
in weighing these factors, the court finds that the strong public
policy interests contained in the preservation rule should be
tempered because of the unique circumstances of the case, then
it should review the claim. These seven factors would help a
court to make this balancing between the competing interests of
efficiency, which is promoted by a strict adherence to the
preservation rule, and fairness, which is furthered by liberally
excusing preservation. As a factors test, it still has aspects of a
backward-looking, case-by-case rule; however, it also provides
parties and the courts a common language to work from. It has
the added benefit of familiarity: These are many of the factors
that courts have been using, except stated in one rule. The
remainder of this discussion will assess the role and importance
of each.
1. An Innocent Person Would Otherwise Be Convicted.
This is the most persuasive reason to review an
unpreserved question: to free an innocent person from
punishment. Most frequently this reason will be cited in the
context of a legal sufficiency claim, where the defendant claims
that the government failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
To what extent does this factor mean an appellate court
should always review unpreserved legal sufficiency claims? If a
defendant asserts that the government did not prove an element
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of the crime, does not this automatically mean that there is
potentially an innocent person in prison? At least one
jurisdiction adopts this view and therefore does not require
preservation of legal sufficiency claims.166 Perhaps the
preservation requirement makes sense only when the allegedly
missing element is technical and could, in all likelihood, have
been easily proved if brought to the attention of the trial court
and prosecutor.' 67 On the other hand, there is a good argument
that such a case is against the interest of justice because a
defendant would be punished on legally insufficient evidence. In
balancing the equities, is preservation really necessary to ensure
that prosecutors know the elements of the crime and present
evidence on each element?16 8
2. Overwhelming Evidence of Guilt Is Absent.
At the heart of our notion of justice is the concept of
retribution and just deserts for criminals. Thus, if there is
overwhelming evidence of guilt, a person should be found guilty
and technical errors should be ignored. Of course, errors not
affecting the substantial rights of a party would be ignored under
the harmless error doctrine, but the preservation stage of the
analysis provides an opportunity to take a shortcut through the
analysis. Arguably, there are some errors that, although they do
not go to the guilt or innocence of the accused, raise serious
questions that might shake the public's confidence in the justice
system. Some Fourth Amendment claims may fall into this
category, for example: Although the exclusionary rule' 69
166. See e.g. Rankin v. State, 46 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting
McFarland v. State, 930 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)); Ward v. State, 188

S.W.3d 874, 876 n. 3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006) (characterizing state's argument of
waiver as "unavailing").
167. See e.g. Whipple, 760 N.E.2d at 337.

168. These issues concerning preservation and legal sufficiency are beyond the scope of
this article; I intend to pursue them in a future article.
169. See e.g. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending reach of exclusionary
rule to states by holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court"); Weeks v. U.S, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(pointing out that "[tihe tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts").
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rewards defendants by suppressing evidence, suppression serves
the greater public interest in deterring olice from committing
The courts' failing at
future violations of the Constitution.
least to review a potentially egregious Fourth Amendment claim
might send a bad message to police and to the public.
3. The Absence ofPreservationDidNot Result From a Tactical
Decision by the Defendant's Attorney.
Here, courts would benefit from the equitable maxims, one
of which is the unclean hands doctrine: 7' A party should not
benefit from his own wrongdoing.1 72 Thus, if there is a
probability that an objection was not made due to a tactical
decision by the defense attorney, a defendant should not be
permitted to change course on appeal and argue that the
objection should have been made.' 7 This leads to the question
of whether, in a given case, the appellate court is able to discern
that this is in fact what occurred.
In some situations, it should be obvious why a defense
attorney might not object at trial. For example, let us assume
that a defendant is charged with murder. At trial, his defense
attorney does not object when the prosecution asks to have the
jury charged on the lesser-included offense of voluntary
manslaughter. The jury finds the defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter and the defendant appeals, claiming that the jury
should not have been charged on the lesser crime. There is an
obvious tactical reason why the trial attorney did not object:
The lesser charge gave the opportunity for a compromise
verdict. In such an obvious case of tactics, the appellate court
should not review the claim on appeal. If the defendant is
adamant that this was not strategy by his counsel, he can present
170. See Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (recognizing, in case addressing issue
left open in Weeks, that purpose of exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to
disregard it").
171. See e.g. Gutierrezv. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2006).

172. Id. (asserting that "[w]hile the government has not raised the issue of 'unclean
hands,' the undisputed fact that Gutierrez is in violation of the law is at least relevant to our
determination of whether the government committed affirmative misconduct in finding out
about him").
173. Of course, this does not prevent a post-conviction motion to vacate for ineffective
assistance of counsel where the reasons for the lack of objection could be fleshed out.

322

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

this claim in a post-conviction motion to vacate and the issue
can be sorted out at the trial level.
4. The Claim Raises SignificantPublic Policy Concerns.
Sometimes defendants will raise novel claims that
implicate significant policy interests. For example, some
defendants recently challenged on appeal the jurisdiction of New
York's felony trial court to hear misdemeanor cases that had
been administratively transferred to it as part of a pilot program
designed to merge some trial courts. The defendants did not
object at trial, but the appellate courts nevertheless entertained
the issue. While the appellate courts did not do so in the interest
of justice-they excused preservation because the claim was a
"mode of proceedings" error that went to the jurisdiction of the
trial court-the example illustrates an instance in which a timely
objection would have done little to affect the outcome, and
hearing the case on appeal would permit the resolution of
important public policy issues.' 74
5. The Question RaisedIs PurelyLegal.
A factor related to the fourth consideration requires
examination of the nature of the claim being raised. There are
some types of claims for which a timely objection would have
done little to change the lawyer's strategy or flesh out the
record. An appellate court's consideration of a purely legal
issue-such as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of
the trial court-would typically not be helped by preservation.
6. The Trial Court or the OpposingParty Probably Would Not
Have Changed CourseIf an Objection Had Been Made.
One of the policy reasons behind preservation is fairness to
the adversary and trial court. There are some cases in which the
adversary or the court would have changed course if presented
with a timely objection. For example, in a recent New York
case, a trial judge excused a group of jurors who had raised their
174. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the judicial transfer orders were
valid. See People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010).
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hands when asked if they would be unable to serve on a long
trial. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court
committed reversible error by not questioning jurors
individually. The Appellate Division refused to address the
merits of the defendant's argument because a timely objection
would have been likely just to cause the trial court to conduct
individual inquiries of the prospective jurors.' 7 5 In other words,
a defendant should not be rewarded for sitting on his claim until
the case goes up on appeal.
7. Reviewing the Claimfor the FirstTime on Appeal Would Not
Deprive the Opposing Party of the Opportunity to Make a
ProperRecord.
Similar to the sixth principle, the seventh is based on
fairness to the adversary. A timely objection allows the record to
be built. Usually, it is the party making the unpreserved claim on
appeal that is harmed by the failure to make a record. However,
sometimes that party's position is clear from the record, but the
adversary has been deprived of the opportunity to make a record
that rebuts the claim. In such a case, the appellate court should
give careful thought to the parties' positions before moving
beyond preservation.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, preservation is a threshold question. Reviewing
an unpreserved question is different from granting appellate
relief on the question: When a court reviews for plain error or in
the interest of justice, it does not agree to enter a finding in the
appellant's favor, but simply agrees to conduct an analysis of the
substance of the appellant's claim. An appellate court can
excuse preservation and still find against the appellant. In fact,
courts should avoid what seems to have been the norm in New
York-finding that interest-of-justice review is warranted
whenever the appellant has a winning claim on the merits and is
not warranted when the appellant has a losing claim. Such a
175. People v. Casanova, 875 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2009) (noting that
"the applicable statutes, rules and case law give the trial court discretion on the matter of
excusing jurors").
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bootstrapping analysis conflates the threshold question with the
substance of the issue.
Courts should also consider giving greater guidance to the
appellate bar on when unpreserved claims are likely to be
reviewed. I suggest a factors test, although one could easily craft
a rule that carves out specific categories of claims for review
and excludes others. 176 The point is to give some explanation of
why a court is exercising its discretionary authority to waive
preservation in particular cases so that lawyers will know when
to raise such issues on appeal.

176. New York's mode-of-proceedings category in effect does this.

